

Winslow Management Company— Proxy Voting Guidelines and Policies

Winslow Management Company, LLC (Winslow) believes that positive environmental performance has the potential to produce superior investment performance over time and seeks to invest in companies that have a positive impact on the environment. Winslow's investments are not exclusive to the environmental services sector (i.e. waste management); some portfolios focus on companies that directly provide environmental solutions such as renewable energy, energy efficiency, or natural and organic food. Other portfolios are fully diversified across all economic sectors, with holdings that meet Winslow's general financial and environmental investment criteria.

In support of this investment approach and in recognition of the fiduciary obligation that Winslow has to its clients, Winslow has developed a proxy voting policy that seeks to promote effective corporate governance structures and encourage improvements in environmental policies and performance. The policy seeks to promote general corporate responsibility, while also seeking to create and preserve economic value. Winslow's proxy voting guidelines and related policies and procedures are designed to ensure that proxy voting decisions positively affect the long term value of client assets.

Oversight of Winslow's proxy voting program is the responsibility of Winslow's Proxy Committee. In addition, designated "Proxy Administrator(s)" are responsible for monitoring corporate actions, making voting decisions and ensuring that proxies are submitted in a timely manner. In order to facilitate the proxy voting process, Winslow has contracted with an independent, third party proxy service ("Proxy Service"), currently Glass Lewis & Company, to vote proxies for Winslow's accounts on Winslow's behalf. The Proxy Service provides Winslow with proxy analysis, vote execution services according to Winslow's proxy voting policy, and quarterly reporting on votes cast. The Proxy Administrator(s) will periodically review such recommendations and may override individual recommendations from the Proxy Service when appropriate. Vote overrides could potentially occur in instances where Winslow has obtained additional information regarding a company's environmental record or a company has committed to undertaking specific positive corporate governance changes. In addition, there may be instances where the Proxy Administrator(s) determine that it is in the best economic interests of clients to abstain from voting at individual shareholder meetings, such as (by example and without limitation) instances where foreign proxy issuers impose unreasonable or expensive voting or holding requirements, or when the costs to effect a vote would be uneconomic relative to the value of the Fund's investment in the issuer, such as when costs would be incurred or revenues would be lost to recall a securities loan and the items for vote are considered routine or uncontested.

Application of the Winslow proxy voting guidelines to vote client proxies should, in most instances, adequately address any possible conflicts of interest since voting guidelines are pre-determined by the Proxy Committee using recommendations from the Proxy Service. In cases where the Proxy Committee has determined that there may be a

material conflict of interest regarding a particular security, Winslow will default to the Proxy Service's recommendations for that proposal and will not have the ability to override the recommendations. For proxy votes inconsistent with Winslow guidelines, the Proxy Committee will review all such proxy votes in order to determine whether the proposed voting rationale appears reasonable. The Proxy Committee also assesses whether any business or other relationships between Winslow and a portfolio company could have influenced an inconsistent vote on that company's proxy.

The Proxy Committee will be responsible for monitoring for potential conflicts of interest. Examples of potential conflicts of interest may include (but are not limited to), investment personnel of Winslow sitting on a company's board, or personal or familial relationships.

When reviewing potential conflicts for materiality, the Proxy Committee will take a two-step approach. First, for those potential conflicts that have a financial basis for materiality, the conflict will be presumed to be non-material unless it involves at least 5% of the Winslow's annual revenue. However, the Proxy Committee should also take into consideration all relevant factors to determine whether the potential conflict could be material even though the financial relationship is below the pre-determined threshold.

Second, for those potential conflicts that have a non-financial basis for materiality, the Proxy Committee will be responsible for identifying those employees most likely to be affected by them (e.g. Portfolio Managers, Senior Management and Proxy Administrators). An example of a non-financial conflict may be the spouse of a Portfolio Manager serving on the board of a public company in a senior capacity. Any conflict of interest involving a Proxy Administrator will automatically be deemed to be material. On an annual basis all employees must disclose any outside business activities and personal investments not previously disclosed or any other potential conflicts of interests.

The Proxy Committee will document the review of any potential conflicts of interest, whether they were deemed to be material or not, and the result of such review.

Vote Summary Reports will be generated for each client that requests that Winslow furnish proxy-voting records. The report will specify the portfolio companies, meeting dates, proxy proposals, and votes which have been cast for the client during the period and the position taken with respect to each issue. All client requests for proxy information will be maintained and fulfilled by the Proxy Administrator(s).

In addition, Winslow will report all proxy votes for the Winslow Green Mutual Funds according to SEC regulations. This voting record will be provided to the SEC according to the regulation, as well as posted on the Winslow website.

Winslow must retain for a period of five years the following records: proxy voting policies and procedures; records of client requests for proxy voting information, any documents prepared by Winslow that were material to making a proxy voting decision or that memorialized the basis for the decision; proxy statements received from issuers (other than those which are available on the SEC's EDGAR database); and, records of votes cast on behalf of clients.

The following guidelines provide an overview of how the Proxy Service votes proxies on behalf of Winslow Management Company. They are guidelines, not absolute

instructions nor are they exhaustive of all of the issues that may arise. Therefore, there may be cases in which the final vote cast on a particular issue before a company's shareholders varies from, or may be inconsistent with, the guidelines due to a close examination of the merits of the proposal and consideration of recent and company-specific information. Any vote will be in the best interest of clients. Winslow reviews these guidelines on an annual basis to take into account new social issues and the latest research in corporate governance.

In addition, it should be noted that although many of the basic governance concepts and social objectives transcend national boundaries, differences in corporate governance standards, shareholder rights, and legal restrictions necessitate a more customized approach to voting in non-U.S. markets. In many countries, the requirements for filing shareholder resolutions are often prohibitive, resulting in a much lower number of shareholder proposals in non-U.S. markets. Differences in compensation practices, board structures, and capital structures necessitate a customized approach to evaluating proposals in different countries. In many cases, shareholder approval is required for resolutions that do not require shareholder approval in the U.S. Mechanisms such as restricted voting rights, share-blocking requirements, and requirements to be represented in person at meetings, make the voting process more complicated than in the U.S. Finally, lower levels of disclosure in non-U.S. markets often make it difficult to apply the same policy that would apply to a U.S. company. Although the following proxy voting guidelines reflect the general principles applied to management and shareholder proposals at both U.S. and non-U.S. companies, specific voting guidelines may vary for non-U.S. companies as a result of differences in market norms. The following proxy voting guidelines are divided up into two main sections: management proposals and shareholder proposals. Please note, in particular, Winslow's addendum for voting shareholder resolutions. Winslow's guidelines for voting shareholder proposals differ from the Proxy Service's guidelines, as noted.

Shareholder Proposals

This section replaces the standard guidelines used by Glass Lewis in analyzing shareholder-proposed resolutions relating to environmental and social issues for Winslow Management Company.

In support of Winslow's investment approach and in recognition of the fiduciary obligation that Winslow has to its clients, Winslow has developed proxy voting guidelines that seek to promote effective corporate governance structures and encourage improvements in environmental policies and performance. The guidelines seek to promote general corporate responsibility, while also creating and preserving economic value. Winslow's proxy voting guidelines and related policies and procedures are designed to ensure that proxy voting decisions positively affect the long term value of client assets.

Winslow will review all shareholder proposals addressing social or environmental issues on a case-by-case basis. In determining whether to vote for a particular shareholder proposal, factors Winslow will consider include:

- Potential impacts of adoption of the proposal on shareholder value
- Reputational risk of the company's current stance on the issue as well as reputational risk if the proposal was adopted
- The company's response to the proposal
- Rationale for the proposal

In general, Winslow will vote in favor of proposals that promote good environmental and social stewardship while enhancing long-term shareholder value. We will support resolutions that propose a variety of policies and actions, including but not limited to:

- Reduction of environmental impact, including:
 - energy, water, and resource use
 - greenhouse gas emissions
 - other air and water emissions
 - waste generation
 - chemical use
- Disclosure of liabilities or risks stemming from climate change
- Adoption of Ceres principles
- Publication of environmental or sustainability reports
- Avoidance of genetically engineered product inputs / appropriate labeling of products containing genetically engineered ingredients
- Avoidance of toxic materials/ appropriate labeling of products containing toxic materials
- Increased diversity of workforce and Board of Directors
- Equal rights and benefits to all employees regardless of race, gender and/or sexual orientation
- Implementation of supply chain labor standards and codes of conduct
- Disclosure of political contributions

US
PROXY PAPER POLICY GUIDELINES

AN OVERVIEW OF THE GLASS LEWIS APPROACH TO
PROXY ADVICE FOR U.S. COMPANIES

I. ELECTION OF DIRECTORS

Board of Directors

Boards are put in place to represent shareholders and protect their interests. Glass Lewis seeks boards with a proven record of protecting shareholders and delivering value over the medium- and long-term. We believe that boards working to protect and enhance the best interests of shareholders are independent, have directors with diverse backgrounds, have a record of positive performance, and have members with a breadth and depth of relevant experience.

Board Composition

We look at each individual on the board and examine his or her relationships with the company, the company's executives and with other board members. The purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether pre-existing personal, familial or financial relationships are likely to impact the decisions of that board member.

We vote in favor of governance structures that will drive positive performance and enhance shareholder value. The most crucial test of a board's commitment to the company and to its shareholders is the performance of the board and its members. The performance of directors in their capacity as board members and as executives of the company, when applicable, and in their roles at other companies where they serve is critical to this evaluation.

We believe a director is independent if he or she has no material financial, familial or other current relationships with the company, its executives or other board members except for service on the board and standard fees paid for that service. Relationships that have existed within the five years prior to the inquiry are usually considered to be "current" for purposes of this test.

In our view, a director is affiliated if he or she has a material financial, familial or other relationship with the company or its executives, but is not an employee of the company. This includes directors whose employers have a material financial relationship with the Company. This also includes a director who owns or controls 20% or more of the company's voting stock.

We define an inside director as one who simultaneously serves as a director and as an employee of the company. This category may include a chairman of the board who acts as an employee of the company or is paid as an employee of the company.

Although we typically vote for the election of directors, we will recommend voting against directors (or withholding where applicable, here and following) for the following reasons:

- A director who attends less than 75% of the board and applicable committee meetings.
- A director who fails to file timely form(s) 4 or 5 (assessed on a case-by-case basis).
- A director who is also the CEO of a company where a serious restatement has occurred after the CEO certified the pre-restatement financial statements.
- All board members who served at a time when a poison pill was adopted without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months.

We also feel that the following conflicts of interest may hinder a director's performance and will therefore recommend voting against a:

- CFO who presently sits on the board.
- Director who presently sits on an excessive number of boards
- Director, or a director whose immediate family member, provides material professional services to the company at any time during the past five years.
- Director, or a director whose immediate family member, engages in airplane, real estate or other similar deals, including perquisite type grants from the company.
- Director with an interlocking directorship.

Board Committee Composition

All key committees including audit, compensation, governance, and nominating committees should be composed solely of independent directors and each committee should be focused on fulfilling its specific duty to shareholders. We typically recommend that shareholders vote against any affiliated or inside director seeking appointment to an audit, compensation, nominating or governance committee or who has served in that capacity in the past year.

Review of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis Report

We review the CD&A in our evaluation of the overall compensation practices of a company, as overseen by the compensation committee. In our evaluation of the CD&A, we examine, among other factors, the extent to which the company has used performance goals in determining overall compensation, how well the company has disclosed performance metrics and goals and the extent to which the performance metrics, targets and goals are implemented to enhance company performance. We would recommend voting against the chair of the compensation committee where the CD&A provides insufficient or unclear information about performance metrics and goals, where the CD&A indicates that pay is not tied to performance, or where the compensation committee or management has excessive discretion to alter performance terms or increase amounts of awards in contravention of previously defined targets. However, if a company provides shareholders with an advisory vote on compensation, we will recommend that

shareholders only vote against the advisory compensation vote proposal unless the compensation practices are particularly egregious or persistent.

Review of Risk Management Controls

We believe companies, particularly financial firms, should have a dedicated risk committee, or a committee of the board charged with risk oversight, as well as a chief risk officer who reports directly to that committee, not to the CEO or another executive. In cases where a company has disclosed a sizable loss or writedown, and where a reasonable analysis indicates that the company's board-level risk committee should be held accountable for poor oversight, we would recommend that shareholders vote against such committee members on that basis. In addition, in cases where a company maintains a significant level of financial risk exposure but fails to disclose any explicit form of board-level risk oversight (committee or otherwise), we will consider recommending to vote against the chairman of the board on that basis.

Separation of the roles of Chairman and CEO

Glass Lewis believes that separating the roles of corporate officers and the chairman of the board is a better governance structure than a combined executive/chairman position. The role of executives is to manage the business on the basis of the course charted by the board. Executives should be in the position of reporting and answering to the board for their performance in achieving the goals set out by such board. This becomes much more complicated when management actually sits on, or chairs, the board.

We view an independent chairman as better able to oversee the executives of the company and set a pro-shareholder agenda without the management conflicts that a CEO and other executive insiders often face. This, in turn, leads to a more proactive and effective board of directors that is looking out for the interests of shareholders above all else.

We do not recommend voting against CEOs who serve on or chair the board. However, we do support a separation between the roles of chairman of the board and CEO, whenever that question is posed in a proxy.

In the absence of an independent chairman, we support the appointment of a presiding or lead director with authority to set the agenda for the meetings and to lead sessions outside the presence of the insider chairman.

Majority Voting for the Election of Directors

Glass Lewis will generally support proposals calling for the election of directors by a majority vote in place of plurality voting. If a majority vote standard were implemented, a nominee would have to receive the support of a majority of the shares voted in order to assume the role of a director. Thus, shareholders could collectively vote to reject a director they believe will not pursue their best interests. We think that this minimal

amount of protection for shareholders is reasonable and will not upset the corporate structure nor reduce the willingness of qualified shareholder-focused directors to serve in the future.

Classified Boards

Glass Lewis favors the repeal of staggered boards in favor of the annual election of directors. We believe that staggered boards are less accountable to shareholders than annually elected boards. Furthermore, we feel that the annual election of directors encourages board members to focus on protecting the interests of shareholders.

Mutual Fund Boards

Mutual funds, or investment companies, are structured differently than regular public companies (i.e., operating companies). Members of the fund's adviser are typically on the board and management takes on a different role than that of other public companies. As such, although many of our guidelines remain the same, the following differences from the guidelines at operating companies apply at mutual funds:

1. We believe three-fourths of the boards of investment companies should be made up of independent directors, a stricter standard than the two-thirds independence standard we employ at operating companies.
2. We recommend voting against the chairman of the nominating committee at an investment company if the chairman and CEO of a mutual fund is the same person and the fund does not have an independent lead or presiding director.

II. FINANCIAL REPORTING

Auditor Ratification

We believe that role of the auditor is crucial in protecting shareholder value. In our view, shareholders should demand the services of objective and well-qualified auditors at every company in which they hold an interest. Like directors, auditors should be free from conflicts of interest and should assiduously avoid situations that require them to make choices between their own interests and the interests of the shareholders.

Glass Lewis generally supports management's recommendation regarding the selection of an auditor. However, we recommend voting against the ratification of auditors for the following reasons:

- When audit fees added to audit-related fees total less than one-half of total fees.
- When there have been any recent restatements or late filings by the company where the auditor bears some responsibility for the restatement or late filing (e.g., a restatement due to a reporting error).
- When the company has aggressive accounting policies.

- When the company has poor disclosure or lack of transparency in financial statements.
- When there are other relationships or issues of concern with the auditor that might suggest a conflict between the interest of the auditor and the interests of shareholders.
- When the company is changing auditors as a result of a disagreement between the company and the auditor on a matter of accounting principles or practices, financial statement disclosure or auditing scope or procedures.

Auditor Rotation

We typically support audit related proposals regarding mandatory auditor rotation when the proposal uses a reasonable period of time (usually not less than 5-7 years).

Pension Accounting Issues

Proxy proposals sometimes raise the question as to whether pension accounting should have an effect on the company's net income and therefore be reflected in the performance of the business for purposes of calculating payments to executives. It is our view that pension credits should not be included in measuring income used to award performance-based compensation. Many of the assumptions used in accounting for retirement plans are subject to the discretion of a company, and management would have an obvious conflict of interest if pay were tied to pension income.

III. COMPENSATION

Equity Based Compensation Plans

Glass Lewis evaluates option and other equity-based compensation on a case-by-case basis. We believe that equity compensation awards are a useful tool, when not abused, for retaining and incentivizing employees to engage in conduct that will improve the performance of the company.

We evaluate option plans based on ten overarching principles:

- Companies should seek additional shares only when needed.
- The number of shares requested should be small enough that companies need shareholder approval every three to four years (or more frequently).
- If a plan is relatively expensive, it should not be granting options solely to senior executives and board members.
- Annual net share count and voting power dilution should be limited.
- Annual cost of the plan (especially if not shown on the income statement) should be reasonable as a percentage of financial results and in line with the peer group.

- The expected annual cost of the plan should be proportional to the value of the business.
- The intrinsic value received by option grantees in the past should be reasonable compared with the financial results of the business.
- Plans should deliver value on a per-employee basis when compared with programs at peer companies.
- Plans should not permit re-pricing of stock options.

Option Exchanges

Option exchanges are reviewed on a case-by-case basis, although they are approached with great skepticism. Repricing is tantamount to a re-trade. We will support a repricing only if the following conditions are true:

- Officers and board members do not participate in the program.
- The stock decline mirrors the market or industry price decline in terms of timing and approximates the decline in magnitude.
- The exchange is value neutral or value creative to shareholders with very conservative assumptions and a recognition of the adverse selection problems inherent in voluntary programs.
- Management and the board make a cogent case for needing to incentivize and retain existing employees, such as being in a competitive employment market.

Performance Based Options

We generally recommend that shareholders vote in favor of performance-based option requirements. We feel that executives should be compensated with equity when their performance and that of the company warrants such rewards. We believe that boards can develop a consistent, reliable approach, as boards of many companies have, that would attract executives who believe in their ability to guide the company to achieve its targets.

Linking Pay with Performance

Executive compensation should be linked directly with the performance of the business the executive is charged with managing. Glass Lewis grades companies on an A to F scale based on our analysis of executive compensation relative to performance and that of the company's peers and will recommend voting against the election of compensation committee members at companies that receive a grade of F.

Director Compensation Plans

Non-employee directors should receive compensation for the time and effort they spend serving on the board and its committees. In particular, we support compensation plans that include equity-based awards, which help to align the interests of outside directors with those of shareholders. Director fees should be competitive in order to retain and attract qualified individuals.

Advisory Votes on Compensation

We closely review companies' compensation practices and disclosure as outlined in their CD&As and other company filings to evaluate management-submitted advisory compensation vote proposals. In evaluating these non-binding proposals, we examine how well the company has disclosed information pertinent to its compensation programs, the extent to which overall compensation is tied to performance, the performance metrics selected by the company and the levels of compensation in comparison to company performance and that of its peers. Glass Lewis will generally recommend voting in favor of shareholder proposals to allow shareholders an advisory vote on compensation.

Advisory Votes on Compensation Frequency

We believe companies should submit say-on-pay votes to shareholders every year and therefore will generally support annual votes on compensation absent a compelling reason. We believe annual say-on-pay votes encourage beneficial board and shareholder dialogue on compensation and that the relatively minor additional financial burdens on a company with regard to an annual vote are outweighed by the benefits to shareholders of more frequent accountability.

Limits on Executive Compensation

Proposals to limit executive compensation will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. As a general rule, we believe that executive compensation should be left to the board's compensation committee. We view the election of directors, and specifically those who sit on the compensation committee, as the appropriate mechanism for shareholders to express their disapproval or support of board policy on this issue.

Limits on Executive Stock Options

We favor the grant of options to executives. Options are a very important component of compensation packages designed to attract and retain experienced executives and other key employees. Tying a portion of an executive's compensation to the performance of the company also provides an excellent incentive to maximize share values by those in the best position to affect those values. Accordingly, we typically vote against caps on executive stock options.

IV. GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

Anti-Takeover Measures

Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)

Glass Lewis believes that poison pill plans generally are not in the best interests of shareholders. Specifically, they can reduce management accountability by substantially limiting opportunities for corporate takeovers. Rights plans can thus prevent shareholders from receiving a buy-out premium for their stock.

We believe that boards should be given wide latitude in directing the activities of the company and charting the company's course. However, on an issue such as this where the link between the financial interests of shareholders and their right to consider and accept buyout offers is so substantial, we believe that shareholders should be allowed to vote on whether or not they support such a plan's implementation.

In certain limited circumstances, we will support a limited poison pill to accomplish a particular objective, such as the closing of an important merger, or a pill that contains what we believe to be a reasonable 'qualifying offer' clause.

Right of Shareholders to Call a Special Meeting

We will vote in favor of proposals that allow shareholders to call special meetings. In order to prevent abuse and waste of corporate resources by a very small minority of shareholders, we believe that such rights should be limited to a minimum threshold of at least 15% of the shareholders requesting such a meeting.

Shareholder Action by Written Consent

We will vote in favor of proposals that allow shareholders to act by written consent. In order to prevent abuse and waste of corporate resources by a very small minority of shareholders, we believe that such rights should be limited to a minimum threshold of at least 15% of the shareholders requesting action by written consent.

Authorized Shares

Proposals to increase the number of authorized shares will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Adequate capital stock is important to the operation of a company. When analyzing a request for additional shares, we typically review four common reasons why a company might need additional capital stock beyond what is currently available:

1. Stock split
2. Shareholder defenses
3. Financing for acquisitions
4. Financing for operations

Unless we find that the company has not disclosed a detailed plan for use of the proposed shares, or where the number of shares far exceeds those needed to accomplish a detailed plan, we typically recommend in favor of the authorization of additional shares.

Voting Structure

Cumulative Voting

Glass Lewis will vote for proposals seeking to allow cumulative voting unless the company has majority voting for the election of directors in which case we will vote against. Cumulative voting is a voting process that maximizes the ability of minority shareholders to ensure representation of their views on the board. Cumulative voting generally operates as a safeguard for by ensuring that those who hold a significant minority of shares are able to elect a candidate of their choosing to the board.

Supermajority Vote Requirements

Glass Lewis favors a simple majority voting structure. Supermajority vote requirements act as impediments to shareholder action on ballot items that are critical to our interests. One key example is in the takeover context where supermajority vote requirements can strongly limit shareholders' input in making decisions on such crucial matters as selling the business.

Shareholder Proposals

Shareholder proposals are evaluated on a case-by-case basis. We generally favor proposals that are likely to increase shareholder value and/or promote and protect shareholder rights. We typically prefer to leave decisions regarding day-to-day management of the business and policy decisions related to political, social or environmental issues to management and the board except when we see a clear and direct link between the proposal and some economic or financial issue for the company.

V. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL & GOVERNANCE RISK

We believe companies should actively evaluate risks to long-term shareholder value stemming from poor governance practices. In addition, we believe companies should consider their exposure to environmental and social risk, including changes in environmental or social regulation with respect to their operations, as well as related legal and reputational risks and should incorporate this exposure into their overall business risk profile. Companies should disclose to shareholders both the nature and magnitude of such risks as well as steps they have taken or will take to mitigate those risks.

When we identify situations where shareholder value is at risk, we may recommend voting in favor of a reasonable and well-targeted shareholder proposal if we believe supporting the proposal will promote disclosure of and/or mitigate significant risk

exposure. In egregious cases where a company has failed to adequately mitigate risks stemming from environmental or social practices, we will recommend shareholders vote against directors.